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Reply to "Deaths, injuries reported after Amtrak, CSX trains collide in South Carolina"

Big_Boy_4005 posted:

. . .  99% sure this one isn't Amtrak's fault, they were the victims here. Someone at CSX is responsible for this, and when they figure out WHY, they'll also know WHO. It's a short list.

I would suggest not not making a definitive conclusion yet.  There is not yet enough public information to conclude that CSX is responsible.  Always investigate first with an open mind, then make conclusions.  Otherwise you can go ready, fire, aim. 

When trains are operated under Track Warrant Control (TWC), and a train is to use a switch to enter a track and leave the switch in other than normal position, the crew must be instructed to do so on the Track Warrant.  This is often done, as there is nobody on the rear of the train to restore the switch position for main track movement.  The Train Dispatcher must instruct the next train authorized to pass that location that it must line the switch for its route before proceeding over it.

So, if -- again, if -- the track was temporarily being operated by TWC while the signal system was suspended, then there are questions which investigators must ask, including, but not limited to:

  • Did the passenger train crash into the head end of the CSX train, or into the rear DP  consist?
  • Was the last crew which used that switch, instructed to restore the switch position for main track movement, or were they instructed to leave the switch in the position last used by them?  Did they comply with whatever instruction they were given?
  • Did the CSX train move onto the track through that switch, or did it move there from the other end of the track?  Was it a different train that actually last used the switch?
  • Did the crew of a previous movement of CSX (or of another carrier having rights) trail through that switch without first lining it for its movement, thereby leaving a bent, run-through, switch with gapped switch points?
  • If the previous train was instructed to leave the switch in the position last used, was the Amtrak train instructed to stop and restore its position for movement on the main track?
  • Was the switch locked as required after last being used?  Was the feature of the suspended signal system that records the position of that switch and the time release switch lock feature still functional?  Was the dual control lever left in the Hand position (as required due to the suspension of the signal system), or had someone placed it in Power position, as would normally have been done if the signal system was in service?
  • If -- once again, if -- the Amtrak train was instructed to stop and restore the switch position, then they obviously ran past the switch location at high speed.  How much experience did the Engineer and Conductor have?  How long had they been assigned to that territory?  Had they ever seen that location in daylight?  Were the last two mile posts that the Amtrak train passed, standing in their proper place, in good condition?  Did the Amtrak crew have an unobstructed view of those mile posts? What -- if anything -- do their personal records show about any prior serious rules violations?  What were their scores on their annual rules tests?  Did either of them require more than one attempt in order to pass their rules test?  Maybe they were not instructed to stop and restore the position of that switch.  If not, did the Dispatcher know that the switch was not properly positioned for main track movement?  If not, why not?  The last two questions are critically important.

So, was it the crew of the CSX train? A different CSX train?  A foreign line train?  The CSX Train Dispatcher?  The Amtrak Engineer and Conductor?  Someone else, who either found the switch unlocked or had a switch key and unlocked it and then lined it into the standing CSX train?  The presence of a Conductor on the passenger train locomotive is a likely indication that Track Warrants or other instructions were to be copied and there was likelihood that dual control switches could need to be operated by hand.

It will be easy to get records of instructions issued, repeated and copied.  If they are all in order it will require good investigation to determine whether the switch was locked. and whether the points were gapped.  But there are ways to determine this through good investigation of track components and structure.

Too early for a conclusion.  Lots of questions must be asked and answered first.

Last edited by Number 90

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