RailRide posted:More from Railway Age, with a prelimiary report from the Canadian Transportation Safety Board, . . .
A couple of eyebrow-raising quotes :
--The train had been stopped with the air brakes applied in emergency at Partridge, the last station prior to the entrance to the Upper Spiral Tunnel. (the train had been stopped this way for two hours--on the grade)--There were no hand brakes applied on the train. The train then accelerated to a speed well in excess of maximum track speed of 20 mph for the tight curves and steep mountain grade. . .
---PCJ
I have highlighted the key information discovered thus far. Focus on that and follow the investigation into
- why the first crew stopped in emergency
- why they did not apply any hand brakes, to safeguard against the possibility of air pressure leaking down, or against an unintended release of all air brakes, when it became apparent that the train would be sitting on a 2% descending grade for an extended period
- why the second crew did not apply hand brakes sufficient to hold the train at rest while they recharged the brake pipe from the emergency brake application made by the first crew
- what caused the train to begin to move on its own after the second crew boarded the train (i.e., leakage? or unintended release?) and how much time elapsed between the time the second crew boarded the train and it began to move on its own
- Why the second crew remained aboard the train after it began to move on its own, instead of stepping or jumping off
- whether or not the Engineer mis-handled what remaining air brake capability he had available, after proceeding
- the actual amount of mountain grade, heavy train, experience of every crew member on both crews. (Their years of experience do not tell whether most of it was spent in yard or local freight service, or whether it was on a non-mountainous territory)
- whether CP has had in place a program of randomly reviewing, by a competent reviewer, event recorder data from several trains each week which were operated eastward as well as westward, over this territory, and including each regularly assigned Engineer at least once quarterly
- whether CP has had in place a program to review and analyze the event recorder data from every train which stopped from a heavy or an emergency brake application on any main track, and especially on mountain grades
The findings on these yet-unpublished queries will be the path to determining the contributing cause(s). From the information that has so far been released, the root cause has already been found: failure to secure the train with hand brakes to prevent movement of the train before the air brake system had been recharged, on a 2% descending grade. But why? That is the question. Nobody on the second crew remains alive to testify, so -- in addition to the first crew -- investigation into CP's process for monitoring the compliance of its crews may tell us whether improper practices were or were not commonly engaged in.
