The most significant issue is so-called mud-pumping - not filling in gaps in washout areas with gravel. This is even a problem on the Northeast Corridor. ACELA trains do the most damage. With every passing of a train there is roadbed deflection. The water and soil go squish-squish. This situation does not exist in freezing weather. The decision of the previous operator to limit freight car weights was reasonable and prudent. The American operators ignored the problem of mud-pumping by making believe they magically discovered you could run heavyweight cars over the roadbed without consequence. This decision alone may have been responsible for much of the damage. One problem with the sale of the spur to Churchill was the requirement to provide 365 day service. There are two potential engineering standards:
If it can be decided only to operate the spur in freezing weather the operational problems are significantly reduced.
If you mandate 365 day operation you have a more expensive engineering standard.
MIT has developed a low-cost system using five vertical settlement probes, a piezometer, a laptop computer and an internet connection that has been installed on the NEC corridor to monitor the condition of areas of flooded roadbed. You can't evaluate the condition of the subgrade by taking a motorcycle trip over the right-of-way. Cutting to the chase, if an agreement is reached to cease traffic during certain vulnerable periods, the line may be maintained at far less cost.
On a long-term basis we have to look at the hydrology of a drainage basin across a watershed. How long will it take for the water to drain? Will it drain? When will it drain? What can be done (if anything) to speed drainage? The answers to these questions are unclear. In 1975 Canada developed a federal-provincial flood damage reduction program. This was defunded in 1999, presumeably so the Canadian government could spend more money on the parasites at the United Nations.
