A horrific and seemingly avoidable human tragedy!
Number 90 posted:Dominic, Track Warrants copied en route are obviously done by hand. Track Warrants in effect at the time a crew goes on duty are issued from a printer, along with Track Bulletins, messages, a list of cars in the train, and the call sheet (train ID, crew member names, on duty time, etc.)
Gregg, me either. I worked 37 years for a class I railroad and never did encounter a signal system being suspended.
90:
My "warrant" was not clear. I was referring to the DS. Is the warrant originally "typed" into a computer program at JAX by the DS. I know the DS then gives it over the radio, the train crew copies, train crew repeats, DS corrects if needed, crew repeats correction, then DS gives the time stamp that the warrent is in effect.
From the videos I watched I am pretty sure the blame will fall on CXS. Though the Amtrak engineer should have been made aware by a track bulletin that the signal system was off, switch spiked. Though signals should have gone all red if a bond wire was broke. No use speculating just have to wait for final report, but by then we will have forgotten about this tragedy.
rrman posted:From the videos I watched I am pretty sure the blame will fall on CXS. Though the Amtrak engineer should have been made aware by a track bulletin that the signal system was off,
Both the Engineer AND Conductor were VERY aware of the "Signal Suspension", which is exactly why the Conductor was in the cab, instead of back on the train, in order to receive and copy Track Warrants, as they proceeded through the "Signal Suspension" area.
switch spiked.
Switches are locked, i.e. NOT "spiked" unless the Maintenance of Way Department has taken a switch out of service, then it is "spiked".
Though signals should have gone all red if a bond wire was broke.
Again, please remember that the signals were "out of service" due to the "Signal Suspension"!
No use speculating just have to wait for final report, but by then we will have forgotten about this tragedy.
Really??????
Dominic Mazoch posted:Number 90 posted:Dominic, Track Warrants copied en route are obviously done by hand. Track Warrants in effect at the time a crew goes on duty are issued from a printer, along with Track Bulletins, messages, a list of cars in the train, and the call sheet (train ID, crew member names, on duty time, etc.)
Gregg, me either. I worked 37 years for a class I railroad and never did encounter a signal system being suspended.
90:
My "warrant" was not clear. I was referring to the DS. Is the warrant originally "typed" into a computer program at JAX by the DS. I know the DS then gives it over the radio, the train crew copies, train crew repeats, DS corrects if needed, crew repeats correction, then DS gives the time stamp that the warrent is in effect.
CSX EC-1 Forms are generated on a computer screen at the particular control station (dispatcher) authorizing the movement. Variables are filled in by the dispatcher, then issued to the designated employee/equipment requiring the authority.
They are copied in writing, on the prescribed form, in the field (in the locomotive cab in this case) and repeated back to the issuing control station (dispatcher) with both the conductor and engineer required to have a copy in their possession, before being acted upon and considered "complete". CSX rules further require that an employee at the controls of moving equipment may NOT copy an EC-1, unless the movement is stopped. I'm being told that for this reason, the 2nd employee fatally injured, the Asst. Conductor, was in the operating cab of the locomotive in order to copy the necessary TWC authority.
Number 90 posted:KOOLjock1 posted:I'm not seeing where a caboose/crew have anything to do with resetting the switch in this instance. We've all experienced Amtrak trains taking sidings or passing stopped freights on sidings... or passing other Amtrak trains. My experience usually has shown the crew taking the siding works the switch and clears the main and resets the switch to the main. If there are no other instructions issued by the Train Dispatcher, yes, rules require switches used to be restored to their normal positions after use. However, did the CSX train die on hours of service as they stopped in the siding? If so, the crew could not restore the switch. If this was the case, was the Train Dispatcher notified, as required?
Jon
Thanks, would never have expected to discover that hours of service limit would have had them walk away from a switch that needed to be restored to the normal route. Even if someone is notified can you be sure to beat an oncoming train? Seems like another rule looking for an accident, they can call a dispatcher but can't move a lever. Wow!
As mentioned somewhere else, who keeps track of all the switch lock keys floating around?
CTC, An Excellent way to move trains with many built in safety features. I can't for the life of me understand how a railway could just suspend CTC and then run trains through the same territory at 50 or 60 per . Unbelievable.
Gregg posted:CTC, An Excellent way to move trains with many built in safety features. I can't for the life of me understand how a railway could just suspend CTC and then run trains through the same territory at 50 or 60 per . Unbelievable.
So, what would you have the railroad do, shut down the whole line for weeks/months while all new signals and PTC equipment is being installed?
All this information you all have been providing is excellent. I'm learning so much. The procedures sound like lockout tag out. Stinks that this could not have been prevented by some other means. Everything followed by the book but something just missed. 
Dave NYC Hudson PRR K4 posted:All this information you all have been providing is excellent. I'm learning so much. The procedures sound like lockout tag out. Stinks that this could not have been prevented by some other means. Everything followed by the book but something just missed.
Well there in lies the problem, i.e. someone actually DID NOT "follow the book", the book of rules that is!
Aside: Is there a thread running about the Congressional Amtrak T boning the garbage truck in Virginia? I noticed from the videos the gates were down but flashers were off. Perhaps the railroad shut them off after the crash, or maybe a system malfunction?
rrman posted:Aside: Is there a thread running about the Congressional Amtrak T boning the garbage truck in Virginia? I noticed from the videos the gates were down but flashers were off. Perhaps the railroad shut them off after the crash, or maybe a system malfunction?
There were three of them, but they all wandered off into the political siding.
Rusty
Thanks to the all the folks who know what they are talking about. You folks have made this topic very interesting.
Based on the train damage, we're lucking there weren't more fatalities.
Based on the previous drone video, the CSX loco had significant damage to the top of the engine.
That would imply that the Amtrak loco climbed over it after the initial impact and fell over.
It also appears that at the 29 second mark of the video, AmCan 28002 folded at a ninety degree angle.
Rusty Traque posted:rrman posted:Aside: Is there a thread running about the Congressional Amtrak T boning the garbage truck in Virginia? I noticed from the videos the gates were down but flashers were off. Perhaps the railroad shut them off after the crash, or maybe a system malfunction?
There were three of them, but they all wandered off into the political siding.
Rusty
I figured politics would happen. I was just curious of what preliminary findings were (without politics), like they did for this crash. Certainly proves Newtonian force physics when you can knock the truck's load off its chassis mountings.
I have a question, with the switch in question you are saying it is manual (though electric in nature). Does that mean it is only operated by a local train crew, for example, moving a train onto the siding, and is not operated remotely by a CTC operator? Given my experience with switches is based on what I have on a layout, my lack of knowledge shouldn't be surprising. It sounds like the switch in question is manual where access is limited to those with the 'key' to it (electronic or manual), I would assume an authorized train crew....
bigkid posted:I have a question, with the switch in question you are saying it is manual (though electric in nature). Does that mean it is only operated by a local train crew, for example, moving a train onto the siding, and is not operated remotely by a CTC operator?
Yes, you are correct, i.e. it/they are NOT remotely controlled power operated switches.
Given my experience with switches is based on what I have on a layout, my lack of knowledge shouldn't be surprising. It sounds like the switch in question is manual where access is limited to those with the 'key' to it (electronic or manual), I would assume an authorized train crew....
Yes again.
EscapeRocks posted:Tom, in all fairness to Jon,
The NTSB did say yesterday that the CSX loco were on the head end, and that the CSX train came out of the automobile loading facility, moved past the switch, then backed into the siding.
You're absolutely correct. I passed over that NTSB video as it looked like just another TV news clip to me.
And I removed my post that quoted KOOL Jock.
GP 40 posted:FWIW....Some comments from having spent almost 4 decades working in the Operating Department of CSX and its' predecessors......'Signal Suspensions are relativity common on CSX. They are employed to allow operations to continue when updates and/or changes are being made to the physical track structure and/or signal system on a particular section of railroad. Instructions are issued and are very specific as to what rules are in effect and how train and equipment movements are to be made through the limits during the suspension. This is accomplished by the use of Track Warrant Control and EC-1 Forms (CSXs' authority for movement in non-signaled territory among other uses) In this case the signal suspension was implemented due to the need to make changes necessary for installation of PTC. It had been planned to take effect Saturday morning and expire Sunday evening.
While nothing is official yet, reliable information indicates the switch in question (at the north end of what is known as Silica Siding) was an Electric Lock hand operated switch , meaning it is controlled manually, regardless of whether the signal system is operating or not. Sources tell me it was found in tact, lined and locked in the reverse position (lined for movement from the main track to the siding).
The CSX crew had placed the 2 units and 30 some odd multilevels in the siding approximately 35 minutes before the incident and had reported in the "clear" to the dispatcher, giving up their Main Track Authority (EC-1 form). In layman's terms this simply means that they were giving up their authority to be on the main track at this location, their equipment was clear of the main and all switches were properly lined and locked for normal movement.
AMTRAK 91 was proceeding through the limits with proper authority (EC-1) and had no reason to believe their route was not properly lined.
How and why the switch at the north end of the siding was left improperly lined and by whom is what the NTSB investigation will bring out.
I do hope this answers some questions without confusing the matter any further. Unfortunately This is shaping up to be a Human Factor accident caused by a misaligned switch. Again it emphasizes how even the most fundamental rules of operation need to be adhered to as railroading can be very unforgiving when Operating Rules compliance is not followed through.
CJ
If what you are saying when the CSX freight crew reported "clear" to the dispatcher is accurate then the last part says it all "all switches were properly lined and locked for normal movement" ie: mainline operation ?
Hot Water posted:rrman posted:No use speculating just have to wait for final report, but by then we will have forgotten about this tragedy.
Really??????
The public? Really. No doubt. People have a very short attention span when it comes to stuff like this unless it hits too close to home. By the time the NTSB report comes out, I doubt hardly anyone in the public in general will remember this at all.
It's the one big lesson I learned working for a newspaper right out of art school; that the public has the collective attention span of a housefly for the most part.
As for the wreck itself, I can't get over the damage to the lead unit here, looks like the entire front end was ripped off from this view:
Here she is in happier times:
p51 posted:As for the wreck itself, I can't get over the damage to the lead unit here, looks like the entire front end was ripped off from this view:
Here she is in happier times:
Judging by the location of the Amtrak herald, it looks like about 1/4 of the engine is "gone."
Question - Would the CSX engine switching the auto plant normally have a one or two person crew? If it did have two people during the switching moves, would one person leave when the switching was done leaving the remaining crew member to put the train into the siding and shut /lock down the train?
I am asking this because the train involved in the Quebec runaway accident had a one person crew but that accident didn't involve any switching. It was a totally different circumstance.
What is the proper term for putting a train on a siding and shutting it down? Is this a normal practice? It seems that it could be very risky to leave a multi million dollar engine and cargo on a siding without anyone around. I wonder why more locomotives and trains aren't vandalized (aside from graffiti) if this is a normal practice? Maybe vandals haven't figured out how to start an engine and go for a joy ride?
NH Joe
The crew was a conductor and engineer. The conductor handles the switches.
Putting a train in the siding for a new crew to come aboard, The train is tied down. In some cases the engines are left running if the temps get to low, and also keeps the air pressure built up. Hand brakes are applied on at least 10 % of the cars or more if needed to keep the train from moving in the event air pressure is bled off.
hibar posted:GP 40 posted:FWIW....Some comments from having spent almost 4 decades working in the Operating Department of CSX and its' predecessors......'Signal Suspensions are relativity common on CSX. They are employed to allow operations to continue when updates and/or changes are being made to the physical track structure and/or signal system on a particular section of railroad. Instructions are issued and are very specific as to what rules are in effect and how train and equipment movements are to be made through the limits during the suspension. This is accomplished by the use of Track Warrant Control and EC-1 Forms (CSXs' authority for movement in non-signaled territory among other uses) In this case the signal suspension was implemented due to the need to make changes necessary for installation of PTC. It had been planned to take effect Saturday morning and expire Sunday evening.
While nothing is official yet, reliable information indicates the switch in question (at the north end of what is known as Silica Siding) was an Electric Lock hand operated switch , meaning it is controlled manually, regardless of whether the signal system is operating or not. Sources tell me it was found in tact, lined and locked in the reverse position (lined for movement from the main track to the siding).
The CSX crew had placed the 2 units and 30 some odd multilevels in the siding approximately 35 minutes before the incident and had reported in the "clear" to the dispatcher, giving up their Main Track Authority (EC-1 form). In layman's terms this simply means that they were giving up their authority to be on the main track at this location, their equipment was clear of the main and all switches were properly lined and locked for normal movement.
AMTRAK 91 was proceeding through the limits with proper authority (EC-1) and had no reason to believe their route was not properly lined.
How and why the switch at the north end of the siding was left improperly lined and by whom is what the NTSB investigation will bring out.
I do hope this answers some questions without confusing the matter any further. Unfortunately This is shaping up to be a Human Factor accident caused by a misaligned switch. Again it emphasizes how even the most fundamental rules of operation need to be adhered to as railroading can be very unforgiving when Operating Rules compliance is not followed through.
CJ
If what you are saying when the CSX freight crew reported "clear" to the dispatcher is accurate then the last part says it all "all switches were properly lined and locked for normal movement" ie: mainline operation ?
There are many possible scenarios as to how the switch was lined for the siding….. here are just a few of the many possibilities;
The crew may have reported "clear" and simply overlooked the fact that they failed to reline the switch for the main. (entirely probable, as this has happened too many times in recent railroad history)….Hence the many operating rule changes and requirements related to hand operated main track switches in both signaled and "dark" territory and FRA Emergency Order 24 issued in 2005 to address such situations.
The Control Station (dispatcher) may have mistakenly given verbal permission to an authorized employee/contractor to operate the switch with out following proper procedure (possible, yet unlikely), as there would be direct and willful operating rule violations involved as the dispatcher would have to override the Computer Assisted Dispatch system which would detect the EC-1 issued to AMTRAK 91 and alert the dispatcher to the conflict of track authorities.
Another employee/contractor (possibly a signal maintainer) may have operated the switch for many different reasons. Keep in mind the purpose of the "signal suspension" was for the track segment to be prepared for PTC and position of switch detection is a major aspect of Positive Train Control.
Unauthorized use..i.e. vandalism/sabotage (possible, not probable).
Remember, having rules in place doesn't guarantee compliance. In the end it is the people performing the tasks, and their strict adherence to the rules, that make the operation work. The simplest of shortcuts and circumventing of the operating rules, or parts thereof, often have had catastrophic consequences.
New Haven Joe posted:Question - Would the CSX engine switching the auto plant normally have a one or two person crew?
At least a two person crew, i.e. an Engineer and a Conductor. Some local switching jobs might also have a third person, a Brakeman.
If it did have two people during the switching moves, would one person leave when the switching was done leaving the remaining crew member to put the train into the siding and shut /lock down the train?
No. The Conductor would be in radio communication with the Engineer telling him/her what moves to make.
I am asking this because the train involved in the Quebec runaway accident had a one person crew but that accident didn't involve any switching. It was a totally different circumstance.
Yes, totally different, not mention that the Engineer (the ONLY crew member) did NOT properly apply sufficient hand brakes on the loaded train cars.
What is the proper term for putting a train on a siding and shutting it down?
It is generally referred to as "tying down the train".
Is this a normal practice?
Happens all the time, on railroads throughout North America.
It seems that it could be very risky to leave a multi million dollar engine and cargo on a siding without anyone around. I wonder why more locomotives and trains aren't vandalized (aside from graffiti) if this is a normal practice?
Most, if not all class one railroads have lockable cab doors on all these modern units.
Maybe vandals haven't figured out how to start an engine and go for a joy ride?
First they would have to get into the cab. Although it has happened, going for a "joy ride" is pretty difficult for such idiots to accomplish, especially when the unit/units are coupled to a "tied down" train.
NH Joe
p51 posted:Hot Water posted:rrman posted:No use speculating just have to wait for final report, but by then we will have forgotten about this tragedy.
Really??????
The public? Really. No doubt. People have a very short attention span when it comes to stuff like this unless it hits too close to home. By the time the NTSB report comes out, I doubt hardly anyone in the public in general will remember this at all.
It's the one big lesson I learned working for a newspaper right out of art school; that the public has the collective attention span of a housefly for the most part.
As for the wreck itself, I can't get over the damage to the lead unit here, looks like the entire front end was ripped off from this view:
Here she is in happier times:
Are these engines prone to climbing over other equipment in crashes?
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RichO posted:p51 posted:Hot Water posted:rrman posted:No use speculating just have to wait for final report, but by then we will have forgotten about this tragedy.
Really??????
The public? Really. No doubt. People have a very short attention span when it comes to stuff like this unless it hits too close to home. By the time the NTSB report comes out, I doubt hardly anyone in the public in general will remember this at all.
It's the one big lesson I learned working for a newspaper right out of art school; that the public has the collective attention span of a housefly for the most part.
As for the wreck itself, I can't get over the damage to the lead unit here, looks like the entire front end was ripped off from this view:
Here she is in happier times:
Are these engines prone to climbing over other equipment in crashes?
A lot depends on the speed of the Amtrak unit vs. the speed of what they run into. If the Amtrak is operating at say 55 to 60 MPH, and it runs into a something that is stopped, simple physics would seem to indicate that the thing will take to the air!
Big Jim posted:Dennis LaGrua posted:the engineer in the Amtrak cab at 59 mph never had a chance to touch the brakes or even hit the floor.
And you know this how?
I'll wager that the engineer knew exactly what was going on when he lurched through that switch, put the train in emergency and that the impact was much less than the 59mph the news media is spouting out!
That area at 2:30 AM was almost pitch black and as soon as the train switched to the siding there was only 1320 ft to stop. At 60 mph that's one mile per minute or 15 seconds from the time that the train switched over. Add in perhaps a bit of chit chat between conductor and engineer on a typically normal run, not realizing what is happening until the last few seconds and I say its unlikely that the engineer had any time to react. Look at the engine, nearly one half of it is collapsed. That was a hard hit at some speed. Lets see what the NTSB investigation reveals.
I assume RR record radio conversations and hold them for X time in case there was a procedure question? I know 911 and public safety for the most part do this in case of emergencies in case there was a mis direction or wrong orders/addresses given.
rrman posted:I assume RR record radio conversations and hold them for X time in case there was a procedure question?
Yes.
I know 911 and public safety for the most part do this in case of emergencies in case there was a mis direction or wrong orders/addresses given.
Hot Water posted:Gregg posted:CTC, An Excellent way to move trains with many built in safety features. I can't for the life of me understand how a railway could just suspend CTC and then run trains through the same territory at 50 or 60 per . Unbelievable.
So, what would you have the railroad do, shut down the whole line for weeks/months while all new signals and PTC equipment is being installed?
No one mentioned installing all new signals,,, Why not just obey the existing CTC rules governing stop signals. Trains can still get over the road however at a slower pace. Traffic can still move.... How many blocks were out of service at once. Maybe GP40 knows.?
BTW I've never across a siding in CTC territory used for meets (passing siding)with hand operated Electric lock switches. Most have duel control power switches.
RichO posted:
Are these engines prone to climbing over other equipment in crashes?
I don't know anything about locomotives, but in your photo ..... I would think that the reaction to the shearing force to the bottom of the engine, from the low end of that well car, gave it some upward trajectory.
Anyway .... what a horrible accident in Carolina.
EBT Jim posted:RichO posted:
Are these engines prone to climbing over other equipment in crashes?
I don't know anything about locomotives, but in your photo ..... I would think that the reaction to the shearing force to the bottom of the engine, from the low end of that well car, gave it some upward trajectory.
Anyway .... what a horrible accident in Carolina.
I'm no modern locomotive expert, but most locomotives I've seen by have a thick bar above the pilot called the anti-climber designed to catch the coupler of the colliding locomotive or car to prevent upward motion into the (occupied) cab and divert that locomotive or car to the side.
It looks like those Amtrak Genesis locomotives don't have one, or if they do it's not very noticeable. I can't tell exactly what type the crunched up CSX locomotive is, but it looks like it didn't have one to allow the Amtrak locomotive to ride up on top of it and cause that much upper body damage.
Mikado 4501 posted:I'm no modern locomotive expert, but most locomotives I've seen by have a thick bar above the pilot called the anti-climber designed to catch the coupler of the colliding locomotive or car to prevent upward motion into the (occupied) cab and divert that locomotive or car to the side.
It looks like those Amtrak Genesis locomotives don't have one, or if they do it's not very noticeable. I can't tell exactly what type the crunched up CSX locomotive is, but it looks like it didn't have one to allow the Amtrak locomotive to ride up on top of it and cause that much upper body damage.
Sometimes, anti-climbers aren't much help:
There are too many variables in a train collision to make blanket statements about locomotive construction.
Rusty
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Gregg posted:Hot Water posted:Gregg posted:CTC, An Excellent way to move trains with many built in safety features. I can't for the life of me understand how a railway could just suspend CTC and then run trains through the same territory at 50 or 60 per . Unbelievable.
So, what would you have the railroad do, shut down the whole line for weeks/months while all new signals and PTC equipment is being installed?
No one mentioned installing all new signals,,, Why not just obey the existing CTC rules governing stop signals. Trains can still get over the road however at a slower pace. Traffic can still move....Often the limits of a Signal Suspension can be several miles in length, dependent on the type of work to be performed, and locations of other infrastructure left in service, including Controlled Signals and passing sidings/terminals. Daily traffic demands, especially on AMTRAK, commuter, and intermodal routes are always a concern. (This one was being performed over a weekend , possibly due to the fact some locals, and intermodal trains do not operate on Saturday or Sunday). Moving these trains along, with heavy unit or miscellaneous freight trains, all being forced to comply with Absolute Stop or Restricting Signals is simply not feasible in many cases.
How many blocks were out of service at once.
I don't have that information at the moment.
Maybe GP40 knows.?
BTW I've never across a siding in CTC territory used for meets (passing siding)with hand operated Electric lock switches. Most have duel control power switches. The switch in question is a Hand Operated Electric Lock switch.
Well, you are quite right Rusty. I think there was a head on accident decades ago on the Burlington Northern that killed the conductor in a locomotive that did have an anti-climber. No technology is perfect apparently.
Last fall, I was in Flatonia TX watching trains not on the ROW. I also had a hand held radio with ARR freqs in it. There is a rail crossing there. The Flatonia Sub has CTC. The Cuero Sub is dark to the South, but CTC to Muldoon siding to the north. However North Switch Muldoon is just beyond CTC. It seems trains had to tell the DS before releasing the Track Warrant the position of the Switch at North Muldoon. A UP thing or nation wide?
Dennis LaGrua posted:Big Jim posted:Dennis LaGrua posted:the engineer in the Amtrak cab at 59 mph never had a chance to touch the brakes or even hit the floor.
And you know this how?
I'll wager that the engineer knew exactly what was going on when he lurched through that switch, put the train in emergency and that the impact was much less than the 59mph the news media is spouting out!That area at 2:30 AM was almost pitch black and as soon as the train switched to the siding there was only 1320 ft to stop. At 60 mph that's one mile per minute or 15 seconds from the time that the train switched over. Add in perhaps a bit of chit chat between conductor and engineer on a typically normal run, not realizing what is happening until the last few seconds and I say its unlikely that the engineer had any time to react. Look at the engine, nearly one half of it is collapsed. That was a hard hit at some speed. Lets see what the NTSB investigation reveals.
Dennis,
Did you actually give any thought to and pay any attention to what you just wrote?
You are saying that someone can't react in 15 seconds?
In 15 sec. & 1320', a whole lot of slowing down could have been done!
Again the real question is, was the engineer still in his seat after going through the first section of the turnout and physically able to react?
Let me give you the short story of something that happened to me.
We had one GP38 and three ex-CONRAIL heavyweight passenger cars with 110 lbs. of BP pressure. We were running on a clear signal down a 1.2% grade at 40 mph. The next signal should have been no less than an "Approach" indication. When we came in sight of the signal around a right hand curve, we were about 1,100 ft. from the signal and it was a "STOP" signal!
The following is everything that went through my mind at 40 mph and at 1,100 feet;
I could make a normal stop, which would have put us past the red board. This would mean that the dispatching center would have to run a signal log to show that the signal had dropped after I had past the "Clear" signal and this would take forever to complete.
or,
I could put the train in emergency and try to stop as soon as we could, possibly without passing the red board and having to put up with all of the crap associated with that as stated above.
Remember we are now at 40 mph & and a wee bit less than 1,100 feet.
I put the train in emergency.
Where did I stop? Amazingly, short of the red board and far enough back that we didn't have to look straight up to see the signal, which by the way a bolt of lightning had made it drop it in my face!
So, don't you tell me that the AMTRAK engineer didn't have time to react!!! If he was physically able to get his hands on the brake lever, I AM SURE THAT HE DID!
February 5, 2018: 10:00 PM ET
NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt's second media briefing on the 2/4/2018 Amtrak collision in Cayce, SC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?...ature=em-uploademail
Gary
I listened to the entire video of the second briefing. Some numbers were mentioned. There was 659 feet between the switch and the point of impact. The Amtrak engine's recorder showed that the train was doing 56 mph when it entered the switch and 50 mph at impact. If my math is correct, at a constant 50 mph the Amtrak train would have traveled the 659 feet from the switch to the impact point in about 9 seconds. Of course, the average speed was a bit higher because the train was slowing from 56 mph.
This probably means that the Amtrak crew had only about 6 to 8 seconds to determine that something was wrong and to apply the brakes. The NTSB investigator said that the Amtrak engine recorder showed that the horn was sounded 7 seconds before impact for 3 seconds. At 5 seconds before impact the throttle was brought to idle and the brake line pressure started to fall. At 3 seconds before impact the brakes were thrown into emergency.
Can a typical Amtrak train be brought from 50 mph to a full stop in 659 feet with full emergency braking? I don't know but I think it is unlikely.
NH Joe
